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Contesting Human Rights through Institutional Reform: The Case of 
the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission 
 
Abstract: This paper presents a case study of the recent reform of the UK 
Equalities and Human Rights Commission, to address a critical gap in the 
literature on national human rights institutions (NHRIs) concerning the power of 
governments to exert control over these institutions through reform processes. 
Through this analysis, the paper demonstrates, firstly, that NHRIs are affected by 
contextual factors not only related to the popularity of the human rights agenda 
but also to wider policy agendas which impact on their status and functions; and 
secondly, that attempts by government to exert more administrative control can 
be significantly problematic for the operational independence of NHRIs. 
Keywords: NHRI; Equality and Human Rights Commission; institutional reform; 
United Nations; independence 
Introduction 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) locate the promotion and protection of 
international human rights norms within the existing state system. Their institutional 
form and duties are shaped by the Paris Principles which were agreed by the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission in 1992 and set out the key criteria that NHRIs must 
meet to receive UN accreditation. Though the creation of NHRIs is therefore a relatively 
recent development in the evolution of the post-war international human rights 
movement,1 they have become very widespread – in 2014, 106 NHRIs existed across 
Africa, Asia, Australasia, Europe and North and South America.2 
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NHRIs, it has been noted, occupy a ‘unique’ and somewhat awkward position within the 
state, both independent from national government, civil society and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) but also accountable to them for their performance and effective 
governance.3 Accountability relationships with government are particularly challenging: 
NHRIs are funded through public expenditure from the state in which they are located, 
and therefore while one of their critical roles is to hold governments to account on 
human rights, those same governments hold NHRIs to account for the efficient use of 
public funds. These relationships are also complex. Anne Smith has identified multiple 
types of independence relating to different parts of the institutional structures of NHRIs, 
including operational, financial, recruitment and pluralism of membership.4 This means 
that NHRIs can experience different levels of independence for different parts of their 
organisation, with operational independence normally greater than administrative 
independence. 
While noting that NHRIs are not shielded from the political context in which they 
operate,5 one aspect of the complex relationship with government that has not been 
explored is the power of government to reform NHRIs and in doing so change the 
balance between independence and accountability. By virtue of their position below the 
political structures of the nation-state system, the existence of an NHRI rests somewhat 
precariously on its public and political support. While the government of an unpopular 
NHRI may be loathed to abolish the institution in order to protect its international 
human rights reputation, it does have the option to instigate substantial reforms which 
can decrease the independence of an NHRI and marginalise human rights protections. 
There are also questions over what constitutes appropriate reform. Government has a 
legitimate concern in ensuring that NHRIs are accountable for spending public money 
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and may engage in the reform of an institution to ensure that this accountability is in 
place, but the challenge is ensuring that this reform concerns imposing legitimate 
control and does not stray into illegitimate interference which might compromise the 
ability of the NHRIs to protect and promote human rights. 
This paper presents a detailed case study of the reform of the UK Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC), to examine how a government asserts its authority over an 
NHRI through institutional reform and the challenges this raises for finding an 
appropriate balance between independence and accountability. The EHRC opened for 
business in 2007 and was tasked with an ambitious vision for the protection and 
promotion of human rights through the creation of a rich human rights culture. Yet, by 
2014 (and just seven years later), many of its responsibilities had been repealed and its 
independence from government had been much reduced. By focusing on institutional 
reform as a form of contestation over the value and reach of human rights, the paper 
adds a new perspective to the literature on the institutional form and governance of 
NHRIs. 
The paper draws on a large documentary data archive to complete the analysis of this 
case, which includes EHRC publications, publications of the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights6 (JCHR), consultation and strategy documents related to the reform of the EHRC, 
parliamentary committee reports and publicly available correspondence between 
senior politicians and EHRC leadership. This documentary analysis is supplemented 
with data from five open-ended, semi-structured interviews with former and current 
members of EHRC management and with civil servants tasked with overseeing the 
relationship between the government and the EHRC. Each of these interviews lasted for 
one hour, and was transcribed and coded for common themes. 
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The paper shows that internal governance problems which had plagued the EHRC since 
its set-up raised a legitimate need for reform in order to ensure effective accountability 
for public expenditure. This, combined with growing hostility towards the human rights 
agenda and other intersecting policy agendas associated with austerity, created a 
political impetus for reform. As a result, government engaged in a radical programme of 
reform with significant implications for the EHRC, which affected not only its 
accountability for spending public money but also the wider independence of its 
operational functions. Yet despite the reform compromising this operational 
independence, the institution has remained in broad compliance with the Paris 
Principles and there has been relatively little intervention from the UN. 
The paper provides insights from these findings for the independence-accountability 
dilemma facing NHRIs. Specifically, it argues that intersecting and often only 
tangentially related policy agendas affect the independence of NHRIs just as much as 
governance problems, and that administrative and operational independence are not 
neatly separable, with the limitation of administrative independence producing 
consequences for the day-to-day operation of NHRIs. This in itself highlights the 
challenge of building NHRIs which strike an appropriate balance between accountability 
for public spending and operational independence, and as a result raises wider concerns 
about the effectiveness of the international system in encouraging improvement in 
human rights protections and the building of rights-based societies. 
National Human Rights Institutions 
While the UN has, since its inception in 1945, led the way in promoting respect for 
human rights internationally, ‘[t]he central responsibility for protecting human rights 
rests with Governments’.7 On ratifying a treaty, a state assumes responsibility to 
6 
 
respect, protect and fulfil the rights contained within that treaty (beyond simply 
preventing human rights abuses), and ensuring that these rights are institutionalised 
into the state’s legal system. NHRIs are a vehicle for meeting these obligations. 
The possibility of national level enforcement bodies was considered by the UN as far 
back as 1946 and discussions continued throughout the next four decades.8 Yet it was 
only in the 1990s, when NHRIs were placed on a more formal international footing, that 
they began to proliferate internationally. The formation of the ‘Paris Principles’ 
provided the formal footing for NHRIs when they were ratified by the UN General 
Assembly in 1993. These principles provided guidance on the competences and 
responsibilities of NHRIs, their guarantees of independence and their methods of 
operation.9 The principles include, among others, recommendations that NHRIs must 
have as broad a mandate as possible to protect and promote human rights, should be 
independent from government and provided with sufficient funding to exercise their 
functions on an independent basis, and should have extensive pluralism in their 
membership. While broad enough to permit institutional diversity in different national 
settings, these principles offer a cohesive set of standards by which to evaluate the 
performance of NHRIs and institutions are rated as A, B or C according to the level of 
their compliance with these principles. Attaining A status has therefore become an issue 
of international reputation, denoting the highest level of human rights accreditation. 
The proliferation of NHRIs since the early 1990s has occurred across a range of 
different types of political system and across diverse geographical regions as a result of 
a widespread desire to gain the recognition of international audiences for a strong 
human rights record.10 The UN has also continued to play a central role in encouraging 
the creation of NHRIs and the development of transnational strategic relationships 
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between them.11 As of 2014, there were 106 NHRIs worldwide and of these 71 were A 
status (fully compliant with the Paris Principles), 25 were B status (partially compliant) 
and ten were C status (not compliant).12 
The proliferation of NHRIs worldwide has been accompanied by considerable academic 
attention focused on these emerging institutions.13 The issue garnering the most 
attention has been the independence of NHRIs, given their accountability to government 
for the use of public funds.14 This independence-accountability tension is inherent in the 
institutional form of NHRIs. Human rights apply universally, attributed to individuals in 
virtue of their humanity; yet, the extent to which they are currently recognised is at the 
discretion of states themselves and the UN’s role is one of ‘achieving international 
cooperation’ rather than enforcement.15 As a result, NHRIs are funded from public 
resources allocated to them by government and, while an appropriate level of 
operational independence is critical to maintaining an A status NHRI, administrative 
accountability to government for the use of public money and for efficiency of 
performance is also critical. 
The tension is also inherent to the institutional reform of NHRIs because they belong to 
a class of organisations often referred to as ‘arm’s length’, in that they are publicly 
funded bodies carrying out public functions but with some degree of independence 
from government.16 The arm’s length governance literature has mirrored the focus on 
the independence-accountability tension,17 but has also examined the reform of arm’s 
length bodies as the assertion of government authority over institutions due to 
concerns regarding performance or efficiency, or because of wider political agendas 
such as the diminishing popularity of arm’s length bodies and a desire for greater 
accountability in public life.18 This literature also suggests that moments of institutional 
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reform are a form of contestation over the value of the institution and its governance.19 
In relation to NHRIs, however, we know comparatively little about the factors which 
drive reform or about the consequences of these reforms for the protection and 
promotion of human rights. It is to the task of filling this gap that this paper now turns, 
through a case study of the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission 
The EHRC was established as an independent statutory body by Parliament under the 
Equality Act 2006. Its remit covers England, Scotland and Wales, but not Northern 
Ireland where there is a separate statutory body for equality and human rights. Human 
rights were largely an ‘after-thought’ in its creation.20 Although the need for a stronger 
commitment to human rights in the UK was noted in the early 1990s, the matter did not 
return to the table until 1996 when the Human Rights Act began to be drafted, but even 
this Act did not include any provisions for a UN-accredited NHRI.21 Rather, the key 
motivation for the creation of the EHRC was the introduction of new European Council 
directives on employment and race, which sought to prevent discrimination on grounds 
of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation.22 This led to the 
passage of the Equality Act in 2006 which brought all existing equality legislation into 
one Act and ensured compliance with the new directives. The Act also created the EHRC 
as a single body tasked with implementing the provisions of the legislation across all 
seven criteria recognised by the European directives. The EHRC replaced three pre-
existing equality bodies (the Commission for Racial Equality, the Disability Rights 
Commission and the Equal Opportunities Commission); these bodies were initially 
hostile to the possibility of merger but eventually supported the move on the grounds 
that it could allow them to more effectively promote equality and non-discrimination.23 
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It was the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) which made the core case for this 
new commission to include human rights responsibilities. It was the judgment of the 
JCHR that the Human Rights Act was insufficient, and that the legal process should be a 
last resort in protecting rights. Rather, a new institution could raise awareness of the 
need to promote human rights in public authorities and could communicate with and 
guide the public in asserting those rights.24 It was also the view of the Committee that 
the right to equal treatment should be considered a human right and therefore equality 
was thought of as compatible with human rights – and, therefore, there should be a 
single equality and human rights body.25  This approach is in keeping with the Paris 
Principles, which state that NHRIs should publicise human rights alongside ‘efforts to 
combat all forms of discrimination’.26 The independence of the body would be critical 
however, as the Committee noted: 
In our view, a human rights commission should be regarded as part of the 
mechanism for protecting the rights of the individual against the misuse of the 
power of the state – it would have failed were it to be seen as an instrument of 
government.27 
The government announced that it would proceed with the creation of the EHRC, 
combining equality and human rights duties, in October 2003. The pre-existing equality 
bodies were less supportive of the idea of combining equality and human rights, but did 
come to support the move on the basis that the human rights functions would provide 
additional instruments for pursuing equality objectives. The JCHR recommended that 
the new body should have as wide a remit as possible, with the aim of achieving 
strategic change through promotion, advice, spreading best practice and raising public 
awareness. From the outset, the intention was to build an institution which was capable 
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of creating a rights-based society with a robust human rights culture, and therefore the 
promotion of human rights was thought of in its most expansive sense.28 
This vision of a rights-based society was embodied in the core ‘general duty’ of the 
EHRC: 
The Commission shall exercise its functions… with a view to encouraging and 
supporting the development of a society in which – 
(a) people’s ability to achieve their potential is not limited by prejudice or 
discrimination, 
(b) there is respect for and protection of each individual’s human rights, 
(c) there is respect for the dignity and worth of each individual, 
(d) each individual has an opportunity to participate in society, and 
(e) there is mutual respect between groups based on understanding and valuing 
of diversity and on shared respect for equality and human rights.29 
In addition, the Equality Act provided the EHRC with five core powers: 
1. Monitoring the law and providing legal assistance 
2. Providing information and advice 
3. Conducting inquiries and judicial reviews 
4. Providing and conciliation service 
5. Allocating grants 
The EHRC was classified as a non-departmental public body (NDPB), which is the 
dominant form of arm’s length body in the UK. The choice of the NDPB model for the 
EHRC was a contentious one, with the JCHR keen to explore alternative options which 
could maximise the independence of the new commission,30 but the government 
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viewing the NDPB model – which had been the classification of the preceding bodies – 
as preferable. As a result of this NDPB status, the EHRC is allocated funding by 
government, is sponsored by a government department (the Government Equalities 
Office – GEO), and is accountable to Parliament through the Equalities Minister.31 The 
Commission was originally set up with a board of 10-15 Commissioners who are 
appointed by the minister, and who may be dismissed by the minister should s/he judge 
them to be unfit or unwilling to perform their duties.32 
The Story of EHRC Reform 
The EHRC was launched as planned on 1st October 2007, and became the UK’s leading 
authority on equality and human rights issues. It raised awareness of human rights and 
discrimination issues, for example through the publication of reports such as How Fair 
is Britain,33 a report which analysed the progress made in the UK against key equality 
and human rights indicators. It conducted statutory inquiries and assessments, and 
intervened on numerous important human rights cases, such as on the rights of gay and 
lesbian asylum seekers and on the rights of disabled people. It also provided advice to 
government on the equality and human rights implications of key policy issues such as 
the use of body scanners in airport security, holding the DNA of those found innocent of 
a crime on a central database, and using information gained through torture.34 
However, the Commission suffered significant problems in its governance and 
performance from the start. The Public Accounts Committee, a committee of the House 
of Commons, reported in 2010 that there had been serious errors in setting up the 
EHRC, which had been further problematized by having three changes of sponsor 
department in the three months immediately preceding its launch. While first it was 
sponsored by the Department for Communities and Local Government, it was then 
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transferred to GEO on that department’s creation, and then moved with GEO when that 
department was itself subsumed to become a part of the Home Office.35 The 
Commission accepted that it was not ready for business when it opened in 2007, 
something the Public Accounts Committee attributed to a delay in appointing key staff. 
The set-up of the institution was found to be flawed and inefficient (costing £38.8m), 
with shortcomings in the leadership of the board and also mistakes by the EHRC 
transition team which did not effectively organise the transfer of staff. This left gaps in 
knowledge and expertise which meant that former employees had to be brought back. 
The reappointment of staff that had been given severance packages, a process which 
cost the Commission over £300,000, was not subject to Treasury approval, and 
therefore value-for-money concerns were raised. As a result, EHRC expenditure was 
deemed irregular by the Comptroller and Auditor General, who gave a qualified opinion 
on the EHRC accounts in the period 2006-08. Similarly severe financial problems 
continued after the statement of this qualified opinion, and the EHRC also lacked 
appropriate leadership at this time – it had not had a Chief Executive since May 2009.36 
Furthermore, former commissioners who had resigned in 2009 raised concerns about 
how the chair of the time had led the agency. The contended that the board was not 
functioning as a corporate body, commissioners felt intimidated to hold the chair to 
account, and there was a perceived conflict of interest with the chair’s involvement in a 
private consultancy firm (a controlling share which was subsequently relinquished), 
although these accounts have been contested by continuing commissioners. There were 
also concerns about how the former chair was reappointed in 2009 by the then Labour 
minister without open competition, driving concerns about his political independence.37 
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Also in 2010, the JCHR reported that ‘the EHRC is not fulfilling the human rights 
mandate set out in the 2006 Act’, and expressed a concern as to ‘whether the EHRC is 
doing enough to devise and disseminate a culture of respect for human rights in public 
authorities’.38 The Committee felt that the Commission was not addressing human 
rights in a systematic way, and the human rights strategy which the EHRC had created 
was judged to be too vague and in need of more clear relation to the institution’s 
objectives. As Human Rights Minister Michael Wills MP commented to the inquiry, ‘I do 
not think [the EHRC] are doing enough to promote human rights and the Human Rights 
Act’.39 
The governance problems experienced by the EHRC were a driving force in the decision 
of the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat government, which came to power in 
2010, to reform the institution. This is perhaps unsurprising given the severity of its 
financial problems. The EHRC received 68% of the total central government equalities 
budget and therefore government was heavily invested in ensuring that it could deliver 
value for money and performance.40 Yet there were a number of other political agendas 
which converged on the reform of the EHRC – specifically, an overarching austerity 
agenda, an anti-NDPB agenda and an anti-human rights agenda. These agendas help to 
fully explain the way in which the EHRC was reformed, beyond only improving financial 
accountability mechanisms. 
Having come to power on a wave of public support for austerity policies, government 
was keen to reform the EHRC in order to increase efficiency and reduce waste. The 
austerity agenda associated with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government of 
the time is as such an overarching and broad narrative within which the reform of the 
EHRC was situated, and for the EHRC this meant delivering improvements in its 
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functions in light of criticism while also spending far less money, as one interviewee 
noted ‘it was accepted that the austerity argument of a shrinking public purse [was] not 
one we could push back on’.41 
The implications of the austerity agenda for the EHRC were most clearly expressed 
through a secondary policy agenda, the anti-NDPB agenda, which combined these 
austerity-related concerns over increasing public sector efficiency with a perceived 
need to reform the EHRC’s institutional form. The Coalition Government swiftly set out 
its intentions to conduct a review of non-departmental public bodies in 2010, and 
subsequently set about reducing the number of NDPBs by 285 as the result of 
abolitions, mergers and transfers into the private and not-for-profit sectors.42 As an 
NDPB itself, the EHRC was not shielded from the agenda. This contrasted with the 
enthusiasm with which the Labour government had embraced the NDPB organisational 
form for the EHRC at the time of its creation, perhaps due to the fact that this had been 
the form of organisation used by the pre-existing equality bodies and it had not caused 
any significant problems. However, in a letter to the chair of the JCHR, Theresa May MP 
(the Home Secretary) wrote of the NDPB review: 
The review’s aims were to increase accountability for actions carried out on 
behalf of the state, to cut out duplication of activity, and to discontinue activities 
which are no longer necessary. The future of the [EHRC] was considered as part 
of this review.43 
The reform of the EHRC was therefore framed in relation to a focus on increasing 
accountability and cutting waste in public life, the core aims of the wider Public Bodies 
Reform Programme.44 It was noted that: 
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The Government remains of the view that there is a clear need for an 
independent equality regulator and national human rights institution. However, 
whilst the Commission has carried out some important work and has deepened 
our knowledge and understanding of issues around equality and human rights, 
its overall performance to date has been weak. It has struggled to deliver against 
its policy remit, for instance attracting criticism on its… failure to integrate 
human rights into its work. At the same time it has not been able to demonstrate 
that it is delivering value for taxpayers’ money resulting in the qualification of its 
first two sets of accounts.45 
The EHRC was, therefore, included in the Public Bodies Act (2012), which provided the 
government with statutory authority to engage in its reform. The government was 
concerned that ‘the EHRC should be retained but substantially reformed to focus it on 
areas where it can add value, to increase its accountability to Government, Parliament 
and the public and to improve its effectiveness and value for money’.46 The decision was 
a contentious one. Early Day Motions were tabled by Caroline Lucas MP, John 
MacDonnell MP and Sandra Osbourne MP in support of the EHRC, and Baroness 
Thornton tabled an amendment to remove the EHRC from the Public Bodies Act when it 
was debated in the Lords. She argued that ‘the fact the organisation established to 
safeguard equality and human rights, the independence of which is vital, should be 
subject to a procedure which may threaten that independence to act on behalf of those 
discriminated against, including against the state, has to raise questions’.47 However, 
government was not moved to alter its plans and the reform of the EHRC proceeded. 
A further set of reasons for the government’s desire to push through the reform of the 
EHRC in the face of this opposition is associated with an anti-human rights agenda 
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which is apparent from the analysis, with interviewees expressing a view that the 
government wanted to ‘send a political signal’48 on human rights through the 
marginalisation of the body. The EHRC had long been operating in a ‘largely 
unfavourable public climate towards human rights’,49 with human rights often seen as 
driving unnecessary ‘political correctness’, wasting public money on bureaucratic and 
legalistic processes seen to contravene common sense. Common headlines from 
populist tabloid newspaper the Daily Mail, for example, would claim that ‘these human 
rights rulings are bonkers’ and ‘political correctness continues to stifle debate on 
multiculturalism’.50 Political support for human rights had also been weakened by the 
security agenda which developed post 9/11 and led to the development of controversial 
policies seen to contravene the right to liberty and security – and an issue on which the 
EHRC was vocal.51  
When the Coalition Government came to power in May 2010, it became clear that the 
typically Conservative antipathy towards equality and human rights law was likely to 
have implications for the Human Rights Act and for the EHRC. Indeed, in the six months 
prior to the 2010 general election, the EHRC was the subject of many parliamentary 
questions from Conservative MPs, and while many of these focused on its financial 
performance, many more challenged the EHRC on operational matters. In total, twelve 
parliamentary questions on subjects related to the operations of the EHRC were tabled 
in this six month period, for example on the activities of the EHRC in guiding local 
authorities on appointments, on their work with traveller communities, and on their use 
of public relations companies.52 Furthermore, two of the questions related to the way in 
which the EHRC sought to influence parliamentarians concerning specific particular 
policy decisions, including on giving convicted prisoners the right to vote. At the same 
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time, the chair of the EHRC was referred by MPs to the Privileges Committees of both 
Houses over concerns that his communication with members of the Joint Committee of 
Human Rights amounted to inappropriate parliamentary conduct.53 
In addition to this concern for the operations of the EHRC, the organisation was itself 
representative of the Human Rights Act which the Conservative party had committed to 
abolishing in their 2010 manifesto.54 Indeed, Prime Minister David Cameron even stated 
that his party would have abolished the Act if it had not been for their Liberal Democrat 
coalition partners, and has committed to doing so since his party won a full majority at 
the 2015 general election.55 Due to the different viewpoints within the Coalition at the 
time, the Government was not able to implement any reform of the Human Rights Act56 
but institutional reform of the EHRC was far more straightforward, as one interviewee 
described, You can’t “you’ve got to get rid of [the Human Rights Act]”… What you can do 
is… make most of it difficult to enforce by reducing the power and potency of the 
enforcement agency,57 and another commented: 
It was because we were almost, as a guardian of the Human Rights Act in the UK, 
it was quite clear that, because it was quite a hostile take on the Act… it was clear 
that our functioning and our mission would also become under attack… the 
rationalisation [was] very much as a means to shrink our radius of action and 
therefore, less people would [mean] less intrusion and therefore, less us talking 
back to government about the Human Rights Act.58 
Government’s proposals for the reform of the EHRC were set out in the Building a Fairer 
Britain white paper.59 The proposals drew on 993 responses to consultation on the 
future of the EHRC, including 224 organisations and 769 individuals. Most of the 
organisations were those representing the kinds of groups whose interests were 
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typically protected by the EHRC. Over half of the responses from individuals were 
calling for the abolition of the EHRC, while others focused on poor leadership and 
management. Most were unhappy with EHRC performance. 
The EHRC itself responded to the consultation, and in its response highlighted how the 
Commission had been making progress towards better defining and delivering core 
functions as an effective outcome-focused regulator, non-partisan, evidence-led 
champion of equality and human rights, and an expert leader for both practitioners and 
wider society.60 With reference to negative public opinion about equality and human 
rights, the response noted: ‘In order to see beyond the popular and mistaken conception 
of equality and human rights as being about political correctness, tick boxes and red 
tape, the Commission needs to have the capacity to operate with a clear set of universal 
values that will “speak” to every section of society’.61 
The Consultation responses were considered alongside views expressed through the 
Government’s Red Tape Challenge Spotlight on Equalities in June 2011, a policy allied 
with the austerity-motivated focus on efficiency in public expenditure, and also in light 
of more positive outputs from the EHRC such as its first satisfactory set of accounts, the 
prompt publication of a new strategic plan, and a 75% reduction in dependence on 
interim staff. However, there were still concerns about the quality and timeliness of the 
Commission’s work and the extent to which its activities were genuinely adding value. 
The government wanted the EHRC to be ‘a national expert on equality and human rights 
issues, and a strategic enforcer of the law and guardian of legal rights’.62 This meant a 
far more streamlined, minimal and legalistic view of the EHRC’s role, in comparison to 
early ambitions for the institution as leading the creating of a human rights culture and 
rights-based society through a wide range of activities. Plans were made to repeal the 
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EHRC’s general duty, which was seen as lacking specific legal purpose and clarity. This 
proposal was dropped in April 2013 owing to widespread opposition from the Lords, 
but the EHRC’s duty to monitor progress against this general duty was abolished, and 
rather the EHRC must monitor progress against its more narrowly and legalistically 
defined mandate for human rights. The EHRC’s good relations duty was also repealed 
because its most valuable work was judged to be carried out under existing equality and 
human rights functions, and the EHRC was also to stop non-core activities such as its 
helpline and conciliation service on the basis of concerns about reach, effectiveness and 
value-for-money, with services instead commissioned from the private sector or civil 
society.63 
In addition, the EHRC was also to improve its financial and operational performance by 
implementing a new framework document giving detailed instructions on its 
governance and including much tighter financial control powers for the government, 
and conducting a zero-based budget review to explore the resources needed to 
underpin the new legalistic and strategic focus of the agency.64 EHRC leadership and 
governance would also be strengthened through the introduction of a smaller board and 
a new chair. 
In summary, the reform of the EHRC can be explained with reference to a perceived 
need to increase governmental control in order to reduce inefficiency at a time of public 
sector austerity and spending cuts, and from a desire to marginalise the organisation as 
the result of an anti-human rights agenda. While the context of austerity would likely 
have meant that the institution would have been subject to spending cuts regardless of 
its popularity, the decision for more wide-ranging reform is rooted in a combination of 
these wider policy agendas. As such, in the case of the EHRC it is apparent that while 
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independence has been lost as a result of poor governance mechanisms, the story of 
reform also points to the importance of context to the independence of NHRIs and their 
functions. The EHRC was unpopular due to a variety of intersecting policy agendas, and 
as a result political forces converged on reform.65 The result of institutional reform was 
far from simply to limit administrative independence as a result of poor internal 
governance; rather, it is apparent that the operational activities of the EHRC were 
significantly affected by reform. This led to a fundamental shift in the purpose of the 
EHRC from creating and maintaining a rich and expansive human rights culture to 
meeting narrowly defined legal obligations. 
Implications for Independence 
Many of the perceived problems with the EHRC which drove this programme of reforms 
had their roots in the independence-accountability tension facing NHRIS which are at 
once independent human rights regulators and state-sponsored bodies with financial 
accountability to a national government. There was a view that the EHRC had assumed 
too much independence and as a result had failed to deliver good governance and the 
efficient use of public funds. As one interviewee noted, ‘it was partly out of control 
because it regarded itself as a uniquely independent body that didn’t take instructions 
from anybody’.66 
The consequence of reform for the independence of the EHRC have been significant. To 
start, Government Equalities Office as the sponsoring department has developed open 
lines of communication with the EHRC in order to ‘get a much better view of what 
they’re up to on a month by month basis’.67 The EHRC’s framework document now sets 
out its governance arrangements, financial controls and requirements for reporting to 
GEO in extensive detail, and incorporates specific provisions for bimonthly ministerial 
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meetings as well. For GEO and the government, such mechanisms are seen as critical in 
ensuring the good governance of the EHRC and thought of as restricted to 
administrative rather than operation control; however, for the Commission itself it can 
appear as unnecessary with the potential to compromise independence. One 
interviewee, for example, described GEO as ‘volunteering to be the schoolyard bully’ 
and coming ‘to a point of controlling the minutia of the way we spent our budget… it 
was becoming quite invasive’.68 
Financial control has been a key issue in this contestation over the independence of the 
Commission. While this control is embedded in the framework document of the EHRC,69 
it also results from a framework of controls which has been applied across government 
and government-sponsored public bodies since 2010, when the incoming government 
sought to significantly control and reduce public sector spending. As a result of 
institutional form, then, the EHRC has fallen under the remit of these controls. They 
impose limits on expenditure across a range of administrative areas including 
advertising and marketing, recruitment, information technology and consultancy, where 
spending above the approved limit requires departmental, Cabinet Office or Treasury 
approval depending on the amount of expenditure involved.70 
For the EHRC, this spending controls framework has represented a significant limitation 
on financial independence, and has led to some controversies which suggest that 
controls on financial independence can themselves compromise operational 
independence. For example, in 2010 the Commission conducted an inquiry into the 
human rights of older people receiving in-home care71 and this led to the production of 
a second publication aimed at ensuring that those older people understood their human 
rights.72 However, as a result of limits on expenditure, the government proposed that 
22 
 
the publication should be online only. The EHRC had to protest to the government that 
it was essential for the publication to be produced in print in order for it to reach its 
audience and eventually an agreement to publish in print format as well as online was 
reached.73 However, for the EHRC this is a demonstration of the ability of these controls 
on expenditure to impact on operational independence – the things that the EHRC is 
doing on a day-to-day basis. Similar concerns were raised with regards to recruitment: 
If I want to hire a barrister to give me an opinion about a human rights case, 
particularly for example if it’s against the government, Treasury and Cabinet 
Office will require that I submit a business case for spending £10,000. And part 
of their judgment will be, “is this a sensible thing on which to challenge the 
government?”74 
In this example, the interviewee is describing their fear that they would have to have a 
spending decision to hire a lawyer to directly challenge government policy signed off by 
that same government, again an apparently administrative form of financial control 
with significant implications for operational independence. 
The government has also taken steps to replace senior leadership appointments at the 
Commission, in addition to the chair. The emphasis has been on replacing previous 
appointees who tended to have particular experience with groups facing discrimination 
and with experience of campaigning and lobbying on the part of such groups, with those 
who could demonstrate expertise rather than direct experience. This included 
appointing ex-civil servants to senior positions in finance, corporate services and legal 
services, and appointing Baroness O’Neill, a leading academic in the field of human 
rights, as chair. This was viewed positively by interviewees from GEO, for example: 
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…legal specialists, a business voice has been introduced this sort of thing. It’s not 
just a direct feed through from the charitable sector and lobbies into the 
Commission… The effect has been substantial because you can actually… these 
people actually know how Government works.75 
Yet, this in itself represents a form of administrative control over the EHRC which has 
the potential to compromise operational independence, as the view of the Government 
that leadership and board members should combine expertise in equality and human 
rights issues with experience of working with government, rather than working with 
NGOs or civil society, is institutionalised as a more positive but potentially less 
challenging relationship with the Government. 
Most recently, concerns for the independence of the EHRC have been raised with 
regards to the Deregulation Bill, which entered the House of Commons on 23rd January 
2014. This Bill is intended to reduce burdens on businesses, organisations and 
individuals stemming from legislation, and includes a ‘growth duty’ on non-economic 
regulators (of which the EHRC is one) to have due regard to economic growth when 
carrying out their regulatory functions.76 The EHRC expressed the concern that this 
would potentially compromise their independence on the basis that it conflicted with 
their ability to complete their equality and human rights duties and this was supported 
by an amendment tabled in the House of Lords by Lord McNally at the eighth sitting of 
the Committee stage, who argued that: 
…subjecting the Commission to the growth duty presents a real risk of the UN 
NHRI A status being downgraded for non-compliance with the Paris Principles 
because the growth duty is or could be perceived to be a constraint on the 
independent exercise of the body’s core functions.77 
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While the government has suggested that it intends to make special provisions for the 
EHRC to avoid such independence problems, Lord McNally’s proposal was to name the 
EHRC as exempt in the Bill itself. This was not supported in the Lords. 
There is persistent contestation over the problems of independence and accountability 
experienced in the governance of the EHRC, but the configuration of an anti-human 
rights agenda with a range of other convergent policy agendas which support its 
marginalisation is likely to mean that its status remains the same. The Joint Committee 
on Human Rights has expressed concerns over the implications of the reforms 
undertaken for the A status rating of the EHRC, and these have also been echoed by the 
UN in a letter to Theresa May in June 2012. This letter called on the government to 
‘review some of the proposals with a view to preserving the EHRC’s independence and 
to ensuring its continued compliance with the Paris Principles relating to the status of 
national institutions’, and, in relation to the changes in skills requirements for leaders of 
the organisation, called on the government to have due regard to the Paris Principles 
which require ‘pluralist representation of the social forces involved in the promotion 
and protection of human rights’.78 The ICC also vocalised concerns that while 
considered individually the reforms would not impact on the A status of the EHRC, as a 
whole ‘the package of proposals clearly constitutes a diminution of the EHRC’s role and 
responsibilities’, noting particular concerns about the budget cuts faced by the EHRC, 
the framework document, and that the reforms could ‘contradict the Government’s 
stated recognition of the importance of the EHRC to be free from undue influence in the 
exercise of its functions’.79 However, the ICC has no intention of reviewing the EHRC’s 
accreditation in its current plans which run to the end of 2017. 
25 
 
The literature on the independence-accountability tension affecting NHRIs correctly 
identifies administrative and operational forms of independence, and emphasises that 
importance of defining between the two in order to retain an appropriately 
independent status while still being accountable for the use of public funds. However, 
the case of the EHRC has shown a number of ways in which administrative and 
operational forms of control are inter-related, which means that in having 
administrative control, a government can affect change to operational matters. This 
dynamic was exposed in the reform of the EHRC, and is critically important to 
understanding the position of NHRIs in relation to national governments. 
Conclusion: Institutionalising Human Rights 
This paper aimed to explore a case of a government instigating the reform of an NHRI, 
to provide insights for debates over how human rights should be institutionalised 
within the existing state system. It told the story of the reform of the UK Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, which demonstrated how the remit of the EHRC was 
fundamentally changed and its independence systematically reduced. 
In exploring the case of the reform of the EHRC, the paper has added another layer to a 
literature highlighting the problems and tensions which emerge from the position of 
NHRIs which are at once above and below government. The government had legitimate 
reasons to reform the EHRC on the basis of significant problems in its financial 
management which compromised its accountability for public expenditure. However, 
intersecting policy agendas focused on the need to cut public spending and to increase 
the accountability of non-departmental public bodies, as well as an anti-human rights 
agenda, led to far-reaching reform of the EHRC which had significant implications for its 
operational independence. NHRIs are built to some extent on the premise that it is 
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possible to separate accountability for public funds from operational independence, but 
these findings suggest that the two are far less separable than may have been thought. 
This raises a significant challenge in finding the appropriate balance for NHRIs between 
legitimate accountability for spending public money, and illegitimate interference in 
operational matters. 
The power to reform is a key way in which government is able to assert its authority 
over NHRIs. While international reputation can act as a coercive force to prevent 
abolition of the institution and its core duties – as in the case study, the EHRC was not 
abolished and did retain its core general duty – the case did illustrate that governments 
are able to significantly curtail the remits of NHRIs without concern for this reputation 
because these reforms to some extent fell ‘under the radar’ of the Paris Principles 
criteria. Proponents of the institutionalisation of robust human rights cultures in the 
existing state system may find much to be concerned about. Far from driving such an 
expansive notion of a rights-based society and despite early ambitions to realise this 
expansive view, the EHRC has been disempowered and marginalised to a more minimal 
legal role within seven years of its creation. This was the result of a negative climate 
surrounding human rights, but it was also the result of a convergence of a number of 
policy agendas, some of which were very remote from the work of the EHRC but 
nonetheless underpinned its reform as politicians worked to implement these wider 
agendas. This demonstrates that NHRIs do not only face the challenge of changing will 
towards human rights in their position below government control, but also must deal 
with changes in wider policy agendas which impact on their status. These findings 
about the EHRC fly directly in the face of the OHCHR assertion that ‘[i]n the past 20 
years, national human rights institutions have developed into increasingly independent 
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and authoritative actors actively engaging with the UN human rights mechanisms’ and 
rather suggests that the EHRC is moving backwards from its initial aim of building an 
expansive notion of a rights based society.80 
The paper also offers insights for debates over how human rights should be 
institutionalised. Despite the independence-accountability tension, generally it is 
thought that NHRIs offer the best way of institutionalising human rights within the 
existing state system. This paper, however, offers some reasons to dispute this. An 
institutional cosmopolitan might suppose, from these findings, that because we have 
duties to create just institutions, NHRIs are simply unable to instigate the kinds of 
radical changes that are needed within societies because they are constantly kept in line 
by government with the threat of reform and operational control through 
administrative means. Rather, we might look beyond the state to create institutions 
with the power to enforce human rights and be held to account outside of the states in 
which they operate. 
The present paper does not offer the scope to consider the merits of such a 
cosmopolitan argument, though it is noted that it is one possible and logical outcome of 
the case presented. For example, one possible course of action would be to fund NHRIs 
through a reformed United Nations, which could then implement accountability for 
public expenditure beyond the state. However, given the spirit of the paper it is perhaps 
more sensible to offer some insights for the existing state system, even if this may be a 
non-ideal state of affairs. For the existing system, the paper suggests that there are 
shortcomings in the extent to which the Paris Principles truly encourage the 
development of robust rights-based societies. In the case of the EHRC, the government 
has been able to enact significant reforms with only very limited interference from the 
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UN and no immediate threats to revoke its A status. While the government doesn’t want 
to lose its A status for reasons of international reputation, it also has plenty of room to 
manoeuvre and the Paris Principles have not set the EHRC on a trajectory of 
improvement towards embedding a human rights culture. As one interviewee 
commented on the government: 
They didn’t even understand the Paris Principles… to the point that the GEO even 
wrote back to the UN saying “oh, we don’t think they should have that much 
independence because we don’t think they will do their budget really well”. And 
it’s like, how can you send a more stupid letter to the UN?81 
This quote illustrates the very point that the Paris Principles are remote to national 
governments, and seem to carry little weight over more pressing political agendas 
which can significantly compromise the role, functions and independence of NHRIs – an 
inherent weakness evident in the Paris Principles from their inception.82 
Reforming the Paris Principles to make them a) more binding and enforceable, and b) 
focused on driving improvement, may be an important step in developing flourishing 
human rights cultures. Achieving this reform in itself would of course be challenging 
because national governments are unlikely to want to cede greater control over human 
rights to a supranational institution; however, given their interest in rating their A 
status, reform is not impossible. Part of this reform could be to place a duty on 
government to preserve the operational independence of NHRIs by making them 
accountable to Parliament rather than government, as is the case for some other NHRIs 
such as the Scottish Human Rights Commission, so that NHRIs to some extent are able to 
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